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In order to assess the existence of expansionary fiscal consolidations in Europe, panel 
data models for private consumption are estimated for the EU15 countries, using annual 
data over the period 1970–2005. Three alternative approaches to determine fiscal 
episodes are used, and the level of government indebtedness is also taken into account. 
The results show some evidence in favour of the existence of expansionary fiscal 
consolidations, for a few budgetary spending items (general government final 
consumption, social transfers, and taxes), depending on the specification and on the time 
span used. On the other hand, the possibility of asymmetric effects of fiscal episodes does 
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The frequently assumed positive correlation between private consumption and fiscal 
expansion may be reversed if some particular conditions are in place. For instance, a 
significant and sustained reduction of government expenditures may lead consumers to 
assume that a permanent tax reduction will also take place in the near future. In that case, 
an increase in permanent income and in private consumption may well occur, also 
generating better expectations for private investment. However, if the reduction in 
expenses is small and temporary, private consumption may not respond positively to the 
fiscal cutback. In other words, consumers might anticipate benefits from fiscal 
consolidation and act as described above. 
 
Non-Keynesian effects may be also associated with tax increases at high levels of 
government indebtedness. This kind of argument is based on “the expectational view of 
fiscal policy.” For instance, if the fiscal consolidation programme appears to the public as 
a serious attempt to reduce the public sector borrowing requirements, there may be an 
induced wealth effect, leading to an increase in private consumption, as maintained by 
Blanchard (1990) and Sutherland (1997). Furthermore, the reduction of the government 
borrowing requirements diminishes the risk premium associated with public debt 
issuance, contributes to reduce real interest rates and allows the crowding-in of private 
investment. However, if consumers do not think that the fiscal consolidation is credible, 
then the customary negative Keynesian effect on consumption will prevail.  
 
Fiscal episodes, expansions and contractions, were determined using the first difference 
of the primary structural budget balance as the relevant indicator, together with three 
alternative strategies. The first one was used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), and the 
second was used by Alesina and Ardagna (1998). The third one, proposed in this paper, 
assumes that a fiscal episode occurs when either the change in the primary cyclically 
adjusted balance is at least one and a half times the standard deviation of the overall 
sample in one year, or when the change in the primary cyclically adjusted balance is at 
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The estimation results for the period 1970s-1990s, using a fixed effects panel data 
strategy show that the long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to general 
government final consumption is negative, which indicates that a reduction of 
government consumption increases private consumption in the long-run. The magnitude 
of such long-run elasticity is higher when a fiscal consolidation episode occurs.  
 
On the other hand, the results seem to indicate that a tax raise, together with a fiscal 
consolidation episode, could have a positive long-run effect on private consumption. 
Furthermore, increases of general government final consumption net of taxes negatively 
impinge on private consumption in the long-run. Put in other words, given an increase in 
government final consumption net of taxes, consumers may behave in a Ricardian way by 
presuming the need for future higher taxes. 
 
The long-run elasticity of social transfers is statistically significant and negative, 
regardless of the existence of fiscal consolidation episodes, but only for the post-
Maastricht period. This negative effect on private consumption could be interpreted as an 
indication of a substitution effect, if the government replaces consumers in paying for, 
say, some health items, or as a non-Keynesian effect with consumers anticipating future 
higher taxes to finance the current social transfers. 
 
Interacting debt threshold variables with the fiscal consolidation episodes dummies, gives 
additional information regarding whether the existence of a higher or a lower level of 
public indebtedness in the previous period makes a difference for private consumption 
decisions. For instance, the short-run effect on private consumption of social transfers is 
positive and statistically significant when there are no fiscal consolidation episodes and 
when the debt-to-GDP ratio is below the defined threshold (the cross-country year 
average). On the other hand, in the presence of a fiscal consolidation episode and if the 
previous period debt-to-GDP ratio was already above the debt ratio threshold, social 
transfers have a negative (non-Keynesian) long-run effect on private consumption. The 
same is true for the long-run effect of social transfers. Additionally, the possibility of 








The fiscal adjustments that occurred in Denmark and in Ireland in the 1980s were used to 
first investigate the possibility of expansionary fiscal consolidations.1 The evidence for 
these two countries seemed to show that a contractionary fiscal policy may well be 
expansionary when undertaken in a situation of public accounts distress, and co-ordinated 
with an adequate exchange rate policy. In other words, when an increase of public 
expenditures casts doubts on the sustainability of fiscal policy and on the level of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio, one may observe an increase of private saving and a reduction of 
private consumption. By the opposite reasoning, after a reduction in public spending, 
fiscal policy may induce an increase in private consumption.  
 
The frequently assumed positive correlation between private consumption and fiscal 
expansion may be reversed if some particular conditions are in place. For instance, a 
significant and sustained reduction of government expenditures may lead consumers to 
assume that a permanent tax reduction will also take place in the near future. In that case, 
an increase in permanent income and in private consumption may well occur, also 
generating better expectations for private investment. However, if the reduction in 
expenses is small and temporary, private consumption may not respond positively to the 
fiscal cutback. In other words, it appears reasonable to assume that under the right 
conditions, consumers might anticipate benefits from fiscal consolidation and act as 
described above. 
 
Non-Keynesian effects may be also associated with tax increases at high levels of 
government indebtedness. This kind of argument is based on “the expectational view of 
fiscal policy.” For instance, if the fiscal consolidation programme appears to the public as 
a serious attempt to reduce the public sector borrowing requirements, there may be an 
induced wealth effect, leading to an increase in private consumption, as maintained by 
Blanchard (1990) and Sutherland (1997). Furthermore, the reduction of the government 
                                                          
1 See Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). The time span of the fiscal consolidation in Ireland, 1987–1989, varies 
with authors. For instance Bradley and Whelan (1997) consider the period 1987-1990. The dating of fiscal 
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borrowing requirements diminishes the risk premium associated with public debt 
issuance, contributes to reduce real interest rates and allows the crowding-in of private 
investment. However, if consumers do not think that the fiscal consolidation is credible, 
then the customary negative Keynesian effect on consumption will prevail.  
 
Several fiscal episodes in Europe during the last two decades have given rise to a growing 
body of theoretical and mostly empirical literature concerning the so-called “non-
Keynesian” effects of fiscal policy. This strand of literature contributed to challenging the 
broadly accepted Keynesian notion concerning the existence of a positive fiscal policy 
multiplier, since the expansionary fiscal contraction possibility may not be discarded so 
lightly.2  
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on fiscal adjustments by looking at the 
evidence from a new angle and timing to answer the question: can expansionary fiscal 
consolidations be detected in the European Union? Using three different criteria to define 
the relevant fiscal episodes I empirically test for expansionary fiscal contractions 
specifically in the EU15 countries in the period 1970–2005. The first two criteria are 
inspired in Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) and in Alesina and Ardagna (1998) while a third 
alternative criterion provides additional cross-check of the results. Moreover, I also take 
into account the level of government indebtedness and assess as well the possibility of 
asymmetric effects of fiscal episodes, using all three criteria to determine fiscal 
epsidodes. 
 
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section two briefly reviews the underpinnings 
of expansionary fiscal consolidations and overviews the available empirical evidence. 
Section three uses alternative methodological approaches to determine fiscal episodes. 
Section four presents the empirical analysis on expansionary fiscal consolidations in the 
EU15 via the estimation of private consumption panel data specifications, which use 
                                                          
2 Bertola and Drazen (1993), Barry and Devereux (1995) and Perotti (1999) presented several theoretical 
explanations concerning the existence of those effects. For an overview of the topic, see also Perotti (1998) 
and Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998). 
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budgetary items as explanatory variables. Finally, section five contains my concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Expansionary fiscal consolidations 
 
2.1. Motivating expansionary fiscal consolidations 
 
Fiscal policy may have non-Keynesian effects on private consumption and investment 
decisions. It is therefore pertinent to identify the conditions under which a fiscal 
expansion may either contribute to the increase of economic activity or increase the 
likelihood of a recession. The basic underlying idea has been put forward by Feldstein 
(1982), who stated that permanent public expenses reductions may be expansionist if they 
are seen as an indication of future tax cuts, giving rise to expectations of a permanent 
income increase. Blanchard (1990), Sutherland (1997) and Perotti (1999) have argued 
that there is a higher probability of fiscal policy being non-Keynesian when there is a 
significant public debt-to-GDP ratio. As the argument goes, “"perverse" savings reactions 
are all the more likely if public debt is already high, since the private sector may fear tax 
increases further down the road to offset a debt explosion” (OECD, 1999). 
 
According to Keynesian explanations, budget deficit reductions, after the implementation 
of spending cuts for instance, should result in a temporary slowdown of aggregate 
demand and of economic activity. According to neoclassical theory, a budget reduction 
would have no effect on economic activity since the supply side is supposed to be the 
main determinant of economic growth. Keynesian theory postulates that after a fiscal 
contraction, aggregate demand reduction is the consequence whatever the instruments 
used. Such reduction will occur either directly, through the decrease in public 
consumption and investment, or indirectly, when families reduce their consumption as a 
consequence of a lower disposable income, brought about by the increase of taxes or by 
the decrease of public transfers.  
 
Blanchard (1990) and Sutherland (1997) maintain that non-Keynesian effects may be 
associated with tax increases at high levels of government indebtedness. This kind of 
9
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argument is based on “the expectational view of fiscal policy”. If the fiscal consolidation 
appears to the public as a serious attempt to reduce the public sector borrowing 
requirements, there may be an induced wealth effect, leading to an increase in private 
consumption. On the other hand, the reduction of the government borrowing 
requirements diminishes the risk premium associated with public debt issuance, 
contributes to reduce real interest rates and allows the crowding-in of private investment. 
However, if consumers do not think that fiscal consolidation is credible, then the usual 
negative Keynesian effect on consumption will prevail.  
 
Besides the above mentioned expectational channel a so-called labour market channel 
could also be active. For instance, Alesina and Perotti (1997a) and Ardagna (2004) 
mention in this context that the composition of fiscal policy may have economic effects 
via the labour market as a result of reducing public spending, notably salaries, instead of 
rising taxes.  Along such reasoning Alesina and Perotti (1997b) define two types of fiscal 
adjustment: Type 1 adjustment, when the budget deficit is reduced through cuts in social 
expenditures (unemployment subsidies, minimum income subsidies) and cuts in public 
sector wages; and Type 2 adjustment, when the budget deficit is reduced with the 
increase of taxes on labour income and with cuts in public investment expenditures. For 
instance, according to those authors, the fiscal episode of Ireland in 1987-1989 was a 
Type 1 adjustment, while the 1983-1986 fiscal episodes in Denmark could be classified 
as a Type 2 adjustment.  
 
Interestingly, the theoretical possibility of the existence of expansionary fiscal 
consolidations echoed in the so-called “German perspective” of fiscal consolidations, 
expressed in 1981 by the German Council of Economic Experts. Such view would 
afterwards have an influence on the fiscal convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, 
calling for discipline of public accounts as a precondition for stable economic growth.3  
 
Blanchard (1990) presents a model where the initial level of public debt is an important 
determinant of the effects of fiscal policy on private consumption. For instance, the 
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increase in taxes would have two effects: the first effect results from the fact that an 
increase in taxes shifts some of the tax burden from future generations to the present 
generations, and contributes therefore to reducing current private consumption. The 
second effect would be a positive wealth effect, related to the idea that an increase in 
taxes today will avoid an increase of taxes in the future and would also allow the long-
term loss of income to be reduced. A present increase in taxes might therefore reduce the 
uncertainty about future fiscal policy. Following this line of reasoning, consumers can 
then decrease accumulated saving, some of which was probably set up as a precaution to 
meet future tax increases. This second effect may be the prevailing one, when for 
instance there is already a high debt-to-GDP ratio. Moreover, with a considerable debt-to-
GDP ratio, there is a higher probability of consumers displaying Ricardian behaviour, 
maybe assuming there could be a fiscal policy sustainability problem ahead.4  
 
When public expenses keep rising beyond a certain limit, there will be also an increased 
probability that fiscal consolidation might occur.  Bertola and Drazen (1993) define this 
moment as a “trigger point,” after which a fiscal adjustment is highly probable. When the 
fiscal adjustment occurs, there are expectations that there will be significant future tax 
cuts, leading therefore to an increase in the consumer's permanent income. The same 
happens with private consumption, and consumers tend to exhibit Ricardian behaviour. 
As Bertola and Drazen (1993, p. 12) put it, “a policy innovation that would be 
contractionary in a static model may be expansionary if it induces sufficiently 
expectations of future policy changes in the opposite direction”. For instance, Cour et al. 
(1996) maintain that Ricardian behaviour might have been in place during the fiscal 
consolidations of Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s.5 In fact, an increase in public 
expenditures, financed by public debt, might put at risk the sustainability of fiscal policy 
and households would therefore increase private saving. 
 
                                                          
4 Evidence of unsustainable fiscal policies in the European Union may be found in Uctum and Wickens 
(2000) and Afonso (2005a). 
5 The application of the Ricardian equivalence to these two countries is nevertheless contested by Creel 
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Finally, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Alesina and Perroti (1997b) also mentions the 
role of exchange rates in promoting successful fiscal adjustments, since a significant 
exchange rate depreciation occurred before and during the fiscal consolidations of Ireland 
and Denmark in the 1980s.6 Indeed, the importance of currency devaluations 
before/during fiscal contractions also can play a role in the success of those 
consolidations. See, for instance, Hjelm (2003) and Lambertini and Tavares (2005). 
 
2.2. Overview of previous evidence 
 
Available empirical evidence shows that the existence of non-Keynesian effects may well 
depend upon the size and the persistence of the fiscal adjustment. However, the available 
empirical work so far does not seem to completely reject the expansionary fiscal 
contraction hypothesis. The composition of the adjustment is also relevant, that is, to 
what degree the fiscal contraction is based on tax increases and public investment or 
government consumption cuts.7 
 
Another compelling point is the fact that an increase in public expenditure will have 
typical Keynesian effects when the level of public debt or of the budget deficit is small. If 
a country has an important budget deficit or a very high debt-to-GDP ratio, a fiscal 
consolidation may well produce the non-Keynesian effects discussed above. 
 
Table 1 summarises some of the empirical evidence found in the literature, concerning 




                                                          
6 Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), McDermott and Westcott (1996), Bergman and Hutchison (1997) and Creel 
(1998) also analyse these fiscal episodes. 
7 Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997b), Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), McDermott and Wescott (1996), Alesina 
and Ardagna (1998), Perotti (1999), and Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000) present empirical results 
concerning the composition and size determinants of successful adjustments. Heylen and Everaert (2000) 
empirically contest the idea that current expenditures reductions are the best policy to get a successful fiscal 
consolidation. Von Hagen, Hughes-Hallet and Strauch (2001) and EC (2003) provide additional descriptive 
analysis and case studies, and Briotti (2005) reviews the literature. 
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3. Determination of fiscal episodes in the EU15 
 
A critical point when assessing the existence of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy is 
the choice of the measure of fiscal adjustments. The literature uses several definitions for 
timing fiscal contractions, relying essentially on the structural budget balance concept, 
the balance that would arise if both expenditures and taxes were determined by potential 
rather than actual output.  
 
The most commonly used measure, the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance, 
allows the correction of all the effects on budget balance resulting from changes in 
economic activity such as inflation or real interest rate changes. This measure is 
frequently used either as percentage of GDP or as a percentage of potential output. In the 
paper I will use cyclically adjusted primary budget balance as a percentage of GDP since 
it is a more widely used measure by the international institutions. 
 
Besides the choice of the budget measure, there are also differences in the literature as to 
how to define the period of a fiscal contraction or expansion. According to the chosen 
definition, the number of fiscal episodes changes as well as the turning points of fiscal 
policy.  
 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) adopted a fiscal episode definition that allows that some 
stabilisation periods may have only one year.8 On the other hand, the definition used by 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) decreases the probability of fiscal adjustment periods with 
only one year by using a limit of 3 percentage points of GDP for a single year 
consolidation.9 However, the above definitions, by choosing arbitrarily 2 or 3 years fiscal 
adjustment periods, end up determining the number of years subjectively. In other words, 
in selecting the time span of fiscal episodes one incurs the risk of finding either an 
excessive number of periods, or of neglecting single year length fiscal episodes.  
 
                                                          
8 The change in the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance is at least 2 percentage points of GDP in one 
year or at least 1.5 percentage points on average in the last two years. 
9 The cumulative change in the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance is at least 5, 4, 3 percentage 
points of GDP in respectively 4, 3 or 2 years, or 3 percentage points in one year. 
13
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In order to identify fiscal policy episodes in the EU15, I used a simple approach trying 
also to minimise, but not necessarily avoiding, ad-hoc definitions of fiscal episodes. 
Annual data for the fifteen EU countries, over the period 1970 to 2005, was collected for 
the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance, computed by the European Commission 
(a precise description of the data is given in the Appendix). Therefore, a possible measure 
of fiscal impulse is the first difference of the primary structural budget balance, as a 
percentage of GDP. 
 
With 505 annual observations available, for the group of the 15 EU countries, the average 
change in the primary structural budget balance is 0.04 and the standard deviation 1.578. 
Figure 1 shows that the distribution is centred on zero but skewed to the right with a 
corresponding long right tail. 
 
Our definition of fiscal episode, FE, in this case defined as a fiscal consolidation, in 



























where b is the primary structural budget balance in period t and σ is the respective 
standard deviation for the panel sample while γ is applied to determine a multiple of the 
standard deviation as commonly used in the literature. For simplicity I use γ=1.5.10 In 
other words, a fiscal episode occurs when either the change in the primary cyclically 
adjusted balance is at least one and a half times the standard deviation in one year, or 
when the change in the primary cyclically adjusted balance is at least one standard 
deviation on average in the last two years. 
 
                                                          
10 As in all the related literature, here there is also an element of arbitrariness. In this case, 1.5σ is 2.4 
percentage points of GDP implying a more demanding threshold to determine a fiscal episode. 
14
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Using the definition in (1) one can determine both contractionary and expansionary fiscal 
episodes. In order to allow for similar definitions available in previous studies, I compute 
also the episodes using the definitions used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) and by 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998), labelled respectively measures FE1 and FE2, while the 
criterion defined in (1) provides our measure FE3. This will provide some robustness 
check for the results. 
 
Table 2 identifies the fiscal episodes in the EU15 countries, according with the proposed 
definitions for the fiscal episodes based in the change in the cyclically adjusted primary 
budget balance.  
 
According to Table 2, the number of years with fiscal episodes labelled as contractions 
ranges from 58, in the approach of equation (1), to 81, following Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1996) approach. Episodes of fiscal expansion are less common, ranging from 39 to 51 
respectively for methods three and one, while fiscal consolidations range from 58 to 81 
respectively also for methods three and one. The average duration of the reported fiscal 
contractions is around 2.5 years for the method inspired on Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), 
and around 1.8 years for the other two methods. For instance Giavazzi, Jappelli, and 
Pagano (2000) reported that extreme fiscal episodes account for a high proportion of their 
data sample, since for a set of OECD countries they labelled around 62 per cent of the 
observations as a fiscal episode. 
 
Furthermore, one can also observe that, on average for the three approaches, roughly 44 
per cent of the fiscal contraction episodes in the EU15 countries occurred in the 1990s. 
No doubt the limitations imposed by the Maastricht Treaty and by the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) urged the EU countries to consolidate public finances from the mid-
1990s onwards in the run up to the European Monetary Union (EMU). 
 
It is also worth noticing that all three methods for determining the fiscal episodes identify 
the usually mentioned fiscal contractions of Denmark in 1983-84, of Ireland in 1988-89 
15
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and also the fiscal expansion of Sweden in 1991-92.11 Moreover, 76 and 68 per cent of 
the episodes determined with criterion one coincide with episodes determined 
respectively with criterion two and three, and 82 per cent of the episodes determined with 
criterion two coincide with episodes determined via criterion three. 
 
4. Empirical analysis of expansionary fiscal consolidations 
 
4.1. Empirical specifications 
 
The empirical strategy to assess the evidence on expansionary fiscal consolidations will 
rely on the estimation of private consumption specifications, which use budgetary items 
as explanatory variables. This is quite in line with some of the existing empirical 
literature. Therefore, the following baseline specification is used 
 
 +∆++∆+++=∆ −−− oecditoecdititititiit YYYYCcC 1101101 δδωωλ  (2) 
1 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 3( )
m
it it it it it it itFCE FCE TF TF TAX TAX FCα α β β γ γ− − −+ ∆ + + ∆ + + ∆ × +  
2 1 4 2 1 4 2 1 4( ) (1 )
m
it it it it it it it itFCE FCE TF TF TAX TAX FCα α β β γ γ µ− − −+ ∆ + + ∆ + + ∆ × − +  
 
where the index i (i=1,…,N) denotes the country, the index t (t=1,…,T) indicates the 
period and ci stands for the individual effects to be estimated for each country i. These 
country-specific constants are the only source of heterogeneity in the specifications. 
Moreover, we have: C – private consumption; Y – GDP; Yoecd – OECD’s GDP; FCE – 
general government final consumption expenditure; TF – social transfers; TAX – taxes, 
and all the abovementioned variables are taken as the logarithms of the respective real per 
capita observations. FCm is a dummy variable that controls for the existence of fiscal 
episodes that are labelled as contractions, with m=1, 2, 3, for each of the three fiscal 
episode determination strategies used in the previous section.  
 
                                                          
11 Recently Hauptmeier, Heipertz and Schuknecht (2006) reviewed some of the characteristics of the main 
fiscal consolidations episodes reported in the EU for the 19980s and 1990s. 
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According to the procedure explained in (1), the dummy variable FCm assumes the 
following values: FCm = 1 when there is a fiscal consolidation episode and FCm = 0 
when those fiscal adjustments do not occur. Additionally, it is assumed that the 
disturbances uit are independent and identical distributed random shocks across countries, 
with zero mean and constant variance. 
 
Aggregate revenue could also be used but taxes are a clearer policy variable to which 
consumers could be expected to react. On the other hand, results using aggregate revenue 
tend to confirm the relevance of the ones obtained with taxes (and this was the case). The 
same reasoning applies to the use of social benefits other than social transfers in kind. 
Additionally, the use of capital expenditures, whose magnitude is small throughout the 
panel sample, was mostly not relevant for private consumption. 
 
In specification (2), ω1 and δ1 are the short-run elasticities of consumption to income and 
to OECD’s income respectively. Moreover, α3, β3, and γ3 are the fiscal short-run 
elasticities of the consumption function for the case when a fiscal consolidation occurs (i. 
e. FCm = 1). It is straightforward to see, for instance, that -ω0/λ is the long-run elasticity 
of consumption to income. Similarly, the long-run effects for the fiscal variables, in the 
presence of a fiscal consolidation episode, are given by –α1/λ, -β1/λ, and –γ1/λ, 
respectively for general government final consumption, social transfers, and taxes. 
 
On the other hand, in the absence of a fiscal consolidation episode (i. e. FCm =0), the 
fiscal short-run elasticities are given by α4, β4, and γ4, while the long-run effects are 
determined by –α2/λ, -β2/λ, and –γ2/λ, again respectively for general government final 
consumption, social transfers, and taxes. 
 
Theoretically one would expect, in the absence of fiscal consolidation episodes, FCm = 0, 
the usual Keynesian effects, that is, for instance, a positive effect of public expenditures 
on private consumption decisions, α4>0, −α2/λ>0, and a negative effect of taxes on 
private consumption, γ4<0, −γ2/λ<0. However, according to the theoretical underpinnings 
discussed in section two, if a fiscal consolidation episode occurs, the standard Keynesian 
17
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effects might be to some extent mitigated or even reversed, with private consumption 
reacting differently to fiscal developments. 
 
Specification (2) is a standard fixed effects model, essentially a linear regression model in 
which the intercept term varies over the individual cross section units. The existence of 
differences between the several countries should then be taken into account by the 
autonomous term that may change from country to country, in each cross-section sample, 




In order to assess the possibility of expansionary fiscal consolidations regimes for the 
EU15, I use annual data spanning the years 1970-2005 for private consumption, GDP, 
taxes, general government final consumption, and social transfers. Taxes are the sum of 
current taxes on income and wealth (direct taxes) and taxes linked to imports and 
production (indirect taxes). 
 
All variables are taken as the logarithms of real per capita observations. This gives a 
maximum of 36 years of annual observations for 15 countries and a maximum possible of 
540 observations per series. Of the 15 countries in the panel data set, 12 are currently in 
EMU – Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain – and 3 others have not adopted the euro – Denmark, 
Sweden and United Kingdom. The source of the data is the European Commission 
AMECO database (updated on 14 November 2005). Table 3 reports the main descriptive 
statistics for the aforementioned series. Data for OECD population and GDP are taken 
from the OECD national accounts publications. 
 
4.3. Unit root tests 
 
This sub-section tests the relevant series for unit roots. The motivation behind panel data 
unit root tests is to increase the power of unit root tests by increasing the span of the data 
while minimising the risk of encountering structural breaks due to regime shifts.  
18
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Several tests for unit roots within panel data have been proposed to address dynamic 
heterogeneous panels. Two alternative panel unit root tests are performed in this section 
in order to assess the existence of unit roots in our data sample. In the first category of 
tests, for instance, Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) proposed a test based on heterogeneous 
panels with fixed effects where the null hypothesis assumes that there is a common unit 









1 εδβα . (3) 
 
The null hypothesis of a unit root to be tested is then H0: α=0, against the alternative H1: 
a<0.12 
 
Instead, Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) proposed a test that allows for individual unit root 
processes so that α in (3) may vary across cross-sections, hence relaxing the assumption 
that α1=α2=…=αN. The null hypothesis may in this case be written as H0: α=0, for all i. 














 ,..., 2,1for  ,0





, implying that some fraction of the  
 
individual processes are stationary. Table 4 reports the results of the aforementioned unit 
root tests for the relevant series.  
 
For the entire sample period the common unit root test rejects the existence of a unit root 
at least at the 5 per cent significance level for all series. On the other hand, the individual 
root test allows the rejection of the null unit root hypothesis for general government final 
                                                          
12 Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) mention that this type of test is particularly useful for panels of moderate size, 
between 10-250 cross-sections and 25-250 time series observations per cross section, therefore a category 
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consumption and for social transfers, both in level and in first differences, and only in 
first differences for private consumption, GDP, and taxes. There are some competing 
results for the unit root tests, with the common unit root tests clearly rejecting the 
existence of a unit root. However, since the variables are already transformed as 
logarithmic growth rates, not using such levels would obscure the existence of a possible 
level relation and make more difficult the interpretation of the results. Therefore, I kept 
the levels specifications. 
 
4.4. Estimation results 
 
The fixed effects model is a typical choice for macroeconomists and is generally more 
adequate than the random effects model. For instance, if the individual effects are a 
substitute for non-specified variables, it is probable that each country-specific effect is 
correlated with the other independent variables. Moreover, since the country sample 
includes all the relevant countries, and not a random sample from a bigger set of 
countries, the fixed effects model is a more obvious choice. This is particularly true if one 
considers the fiscal rule-based framework underlying the Stability and Growth Pact, 
which has been progressively implemented since the late 1990s in the EU15 countries. In 
this case, it would seem adequate to choose the fixed effects formalisation, even if it were 
not correct to generalise the results afterwards to the entire population, which is also not 
the purpose of the paper. 13   
 
Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of equation (2), for the change in the 
logarithm of real per capita private consumption, for the three methods used in section 
three to determine the fiscal episodes. 
 
According to the results reported in Table 5, in all specifications both the short-run and 
the long-run elasticity of private consumption to income are statistically significant. The 
short-run elasticity is approximately 0.66–0.69 in the three specifications. The long-run 
                                                          
13 Additionally, Judson and Owen (1999) show that even if the existence of a lagged endogenous variable 
could imply biased and inconsistent fixed effects panel estimators, such bias is minor when the cross 
section dimension is small in relation to the time dimension of the panel. This holds for an unbalanced 
panel and at least T=30, as in the present case. 
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effect of income is close to one, ranging from 0.95 to 0.97, which indicates that the 
relation between private consumption and income is rather stable for the EU15 
countries.14 The short-run elasticity for the OECD income is also significant. 
 
Regarding general government final consumption there is no statistically significant 
short-run effect on private consumption, either when there are fiscal consolidation 
episodes or not (even though the sign of the estimated coefficients for ∆FCE, α3 and α4, 
is positively in line with the usual Keynesian effects). However, the long-run effect of 
government final consumption on private consumption turns out to be statistically 
significant with the first method for determining fiscal episodes and when there are fiscal 
consolidations (α1); with method two (both with and without fiscal consolidations); and 
with method three when there are no fiscal consolidations (α2).  
 
Interestingly, the long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to general 
government final consumption is negative, which indicates that a reduction of 
government consumption increases private consumption in the long-run. Moreover, one 
should also notice that the magnitude of such long-run elasticity is higher when a fiscal 
consolidation episode occurs (FCm = 1 in (2)), for the first two methods used to 
determine the fiscal episodes. Therefore, cuts in general government final consumption 
seem to stimulate private consumption in the long-run, with or without fiscal 
consolidation episodes, but that stimulus is higher in the presence of such fiscal episodes. 
For instance, and taking the results from method two (see column II in Table 5), a 1 euro 
decrease in general government final consumption is estimated to raise long-run private 
consumption by 24 cents, if there are no fiscal consolidation episodes, and by 39 cents 
when a fiscal consolidation takes place. With method one such effect is 21 and 41 cents, 
respectively without and with fiscal consolidations. 
 
Concerning taxes, the short-run effect does not seem to be overall statistically significant, 
with the exception of the first approach (column I in Table 5), indicating that a tax raise, 
                                                          
14 The share of private consumption in GDP has some heterogeneity across the EU15 countries, with the 
country average for the entire sample period ranging from 0.52–0.53 in Finland, Denmark and the 
Netherlands to 0.66–0.67 in Greece and Portugal. 
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together with a fiscal consolidation episode, could increase private consumption (a non-
Keynesian effect). On the other hand, the coefficients of lagged taxes (γ1, γ2) always 
come out statistically significant, implying a similar significance for the respective long-
run effect of taxes on private consumption. Since such long-run elasticity is positive, this 
would indicate that tax increases contribute to increase private consumption in the long-
run, again in a non-Keynesian fashion. This long-run elasticity is more statistically 
significant when a fiscal consolidation episode takes place, and its magnitude is also 
higher under such circumstances (γ1>γ2), even though one cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the two coefficients are identical (except for the second approach, see 
Table 5). For instance, in the presence of a fiscal consolidation episode a 1-euro raise in 
taxes could contribute to increase private consumption in the long-run by 37-45 cents. 
 
Another point worth mentioning is that the long-run effects of both general government 
final consumption and taxes are quite similar in absolute value and statistically 
significant, when a fiscal consolidation episode occurs (see values of α1 and γ1 in column 
I of Table 5 and their corresponding long-run counterparts, and notice also that in this 
case the null -α1=γ1 is not rejected). Therefore, one can envisage, for this case, the long-
run effect on private consumption as given approximately by 0.41*(FCE-TAX), which 
would imply that increases of general government final consumption net of taxes 
negatively impinge on private consumption. Put in other words, faced with an increase in 
general government final consumption net of taxes consumers would behave in a 
Ricardian way by presuming the need for future higher taxes. 
 
In what concerns social transfers, the results from Table 5 do not show any statistical 
significance, implying an absence of relevant effects on private consumption from that 
fiscal component.  
 
In order to assess possible effects from the institutional changes that occurred in the EU 
in the 1990s, alternative sub-sample periods can be considered to take into account the 
signing of the European Union Treaty on 7 February 1992 in Maastricht, with the setting 
up of the convergence criteria. Therefore, I split the time sample into the pre- and post-
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Maastricht period, using 1992 as the first year of the new EU fiscal framework, and re-
estimated the specifications for the resulting two time intervals. This might be a way of 
controlling for common changes in fiscal policy as response to common problems as, for 
instance, the need to make additional efforts in order to comply with the EMU 
convergence criteria. Table 6 reports the estimation results for the post-Maastricht period. 
 
Concerning the post-Maastricht period the estimation results seem to be more in line with 
the results obtained previously for the entire time series sample, even if taxes (general 
government final consumption) gain (loose) statistical significance. On the other hand, 
the long-run elasticity of social transfers is now statistically significant and negative, 
generally regardless of the existence of fiscal consolidation episodes (see also that in 
Table 6 one does not reject the null β1 = β2). If higher social transfers lead to lower 
private consumption, this could be seen as an indication of a substitution effect or as a 
non-Keynesian effect with consumers anticipating future higher taxes to finance the 
current social transfers. 
 
Concerning the pre-Maastricht period the overall estimation results do not seem to show 
any significant effects, either in the short or in the long-run, from fiscal variables on 
private consumption. This turned out to be true for all the three measures used to 
determine a fiscal episode, while the existence of fiscal consolidation episodes do not 
seem to play a role either. Therefore, these results are not reported.  
 
As an additional test, I also estimated (2) only for the period 1980-2005, and since the 
results are not very different from the ones for the period 1992-2005, they are not 
reported in the text. One can wonder whether the evidence found on the second half of 
the sample is related to entry in EMU, being then consumers’ behaviour more responsive, 
and non-Keynesian, to changes in taxes and social transfers. 
 
4.5. The relevance of government indebtedness 
 
It has been mentioned in the literature that the effects of government spending on private 
consumption may depend on the level of government indebtedness. Specifically, the 
effects of government spending could become less Keynesian if large increases in general 
government debt occur or if debt-to –GDP ratios are already at a high level. 
 
To assess how different levels of government indebtedness may impinge on the 
responsiveness of private consumption, I considered two alternative thresholds for the 
debt-to-GDP ratio by using two dummy variables Byear and Bcountry. These debt ratio 
thresholds variables are defined as follows: 
 
 








where “year average” is the simple average of the debt-to-GDP ratio in year t for the 
entire cross country sample, and 
 
 








where “country average” is the debt-to-GDP ratio on average in country i for the entire 
sample.15 Using the country average debt-to-GDP ratio in each year is relevant since 
capital markets do compare individual country positions vis-à-vis some perceived group 
average. Moreover, if for some years the debt ratio of a given country is clearly above the 
group average, notably in the EU context, the public may become more aware of the 
existence of fiscal imbalances and react differently. 
 
These debt threshold variables can then be interacted with the dummy variables that 
reflect the existence of fiscal consolidation episodes, in order to see if the existence of a 
                                                          
15 For instance, the period average of the debt-to-GDP ratio ranged from 10.3 and 42.1 per cent respectively 
for Luxembourg and Germany to 86.2 and 100.6 percent respectively in Italy and in Belgian. On the other 
hand, the simple cross-country average for the debt ratio had a minimum value of 27.5 per cent in 1973 and 
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higher or a lower level of public indebtedness in the previous period makes a difference 
for private consumption decisions.  
 
For instance, for the Byear dummy the testable empirical specification can be extended 
from (2) and written in the following way: 
 
 +∆++∆+++=∆ −−− oecditoecdititititiit YYYYCcC 1101101 δδωωλ  (6) 
 
10 1 30 10 1 30 10 1 30 1( ) (1 )
m
it it it it it it it itFCE FCE TF TF TAX TAX FC Byearα α β β γ γ− − − −+ ∆ + + ∆ + + ∆ − +  
 
20 1 40 20 1 40 20 1 40 1( )(1 )(1 )
m
it it it it it it it itFCE FCE TF TF TAX TAX FC Byearα α β β γ γ− − − −+ ∆ + + ∆ + + ∆ − − +
 
11 1 31 11 1 31 11 1 31 1( )
m
it it it it it it it itFC E FC E TF TF TAX TAX FC Byearα α β β γ γ− − − −+ ∆ + + ∆ + + ∆ +  
 
21 1 41 21 1 41 21 1 41 1( )(1 )
m
it it it it it it it it itFCE FCE TF TF TAX TAX FC Byearα α β β γ γ µ− − − −+ ∆ + + ∆ + + ∆ − + . 
 
According to the estimation results for specification (6), reported in Table 7, now general 
government final consumption is not statistically significant in explaining private 
consumption, regardless of the existence of a fiscal consolidation episode, and when the 
ratio is below the debt threshold. This result holds for the three different methodologies 
used to determine fiscal consolidation episodes. If the debt ratio is above the debt 
threshold and in the absence of a fiscal consolidation episode, the long-run effect of the 
general government final consumption (α21) varies across the three methods of 
determination of fiscal episodes. 
 
Regarding social transfers, the short-run effect on private consumption is positive and 
statistically significant when there are no fiscal consolidation episodes and when the 
debt-to-GDP ratio is below the defined threshold (β40). On the other hand, in the presence 
of a fiscal consolidation episode and if the previous period debt-to-GDP ratio was already 
above the debt ratio threshold, social transfers have a negative (non-Keynesian) long-run 
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The results from Table 7 indicate also that taxes have a positive (non-Keynesian) long-
run effect on private consumption when there are no fiscal consolidations and when the 
debt ratio is below the relevant threshold (γ20). Additionally, for the cases when the debt 
ratio is above the threshold, the significance of such non-Keynesian effects increases, 
which could be interpreted along the lines proposed by Blanchard (1990), as a reduction 
of uncertainty about future fiscal policy unbalances. Moreover, the robustness of the 
result is higher when a fiscal consolidation occurs (γ11), under the first two strategies used 
to determine the existence of fiscal episodes (columns I and II of Table 7).16 
 
The alternative set of results for specification (6), using as the dummy threshold for the 
debt-to-GDP ratio the average in year t for the entire country sample, as determined in 
(5), are reported in Table 8. 
 
These additional results show that when the debt threshold is not surpassed, general 
government final consumption has a negative (non-Keynesian) long-run effect on private 
consumption and this effect is of a bigger magnitude when there is a fiscal consolidation 
episode (|α10| > |α20|). This result is mostly visible for the first and third strategies used to 
determine the occurrence of fiscal episodes (columns I and III in Table 8), and it also 
holds when the country debt-to-GDP ratio is above the country average and when there is 
a consolidation episode (α11 in column I).17 
 
Taxes depict a positive (non-Keynesian) long-run effect on private consumption when the 
debt-to-GDP ratio is below the relevant threshold. When the debt ratio threshold is 
surpassed a positive and statistically long-run effect of taxes on private consumption is 
mostly visible when coupled with a fiscal consolidation episode (γ11). 
 
                                                          
16 The interaction of the year average for the debt dummy with the fiscal episode dummy results in a split of 
the fiscal episodes into two roughly equal sized sub-samples (for the three methods used to determine the 
fiscal episodes). 
17 One can mention that the use of the country average for the debt dummy interaction results 
approximately in a two thirds (one third) sub-sample of fiscal consolidations episodes coupled with the 
debt-to-GDP ratio above (below) the threshold. 
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Social transfers have a statistically significant negative (non-Keynesian) long-run effect 
when a fiscal consolidation episode occurs and the debt ratio is above the threshold, for 
the last two methods used to determine the fiscal episodes (β11, columns II and III in 
Table 8). Below the debt threshold social transfers have a positive (Keynesian) short- and 
long-run impact on private consumption, which is only significant for the first method of 
selection of fiscal episodes (β10 and β30 in column I). 
 
I did an additional analysis regarding alternative debt-to-GDP ratio thresholds. For 
instance, with the thresholds of 40% and 60%, this breaks the panel sample into three 
more or less equal sized sub-samples, with 196, 164 and 184 observations respectively 
below 40%, between 40% and 60% and above 60%. However, the results for such 
alternative calculations (not reported in the paper for the sake of size) did not provide 
relevant additional insights. 
 
4.6. Are contractions different from expansions? 
 
In this sub-section I briefly investigate the possibility of non-Keynesian effects being 
more likely to occur when a fiscal episode is characterised by a fiscal contraction, rather 
than by a fiscal expansion. This could imply the existence of asymmetric effects of fiscal 
policy, as argued notably by Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000). 
 
In the current set up this assessment of asymmetric responses to fiscal policy episodes 
can be done using the following alternative specification: 
 
 +∆++∆+++=∆ −−− oecditoecdititititiit YYYYCcC 1101101 δδωωλ  (7) 
 
5 1 6 5 1 6 5 1 6( ) (1 ) (1 )
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In (7) FCm is still a dummy variable that controls for the existence of contractionary fiscal 
episodes. Therefore, as before, FCm assumes the following values: FCm = 1 when there is 
a contractionary fiscal episode and FEm = 0 when such episode does not occur. On the 
other hand, FXm is a dummy variable that controls for the existence of expansionary fiscal 
episodes. FXm assumes the following values: FXm = 1 when there is an expansionary 
fiscal episode and FXm = 0 when such episode does not occur. 
 
For instance, we can notice in (7) the several possibilities for the occurrence of fiscal 
episodes, as follows. The last line from the bottom is relevant for the cases when 
contractionary fiscal episodes occur (FCm = 1 and FXm = 0). The second line from the 
bottom captures the cases when expansionary fiscal episodes occur (FCm = 0 and FXm = 
1). The third line from the bottom corresponds to a situation where no fiscal episodes 
occur at all (FCm = 0 and FXm = 0). 
 
The estimation results for (7) are reported in Table 9. For the case where a fiscal 
consolidation occurs the results are naturally virtually identical to what was reported 
before in Table 5. When a fiscal expansion episode takes place one can notice that the 
long-run effect of taxes on private consumption is still positive (non-Keynesian) even if 
less statistically significant, which in the end does not seem to support the idea of 
asymmetric consumer behaviour (γ2). 
 
Interestingly, in the absence of fiscal episodes, the long-run effect of taxes is also present 
(γ5), while the negative long-run impact of general government final consumption 
expenditure on private consumption also holds true, even if now only statistically 
significant for the third strategy of determination of fiscal episodes (α5 in column III). 
 
Again, specification (7) was estimated only for the post-Maastricht period and the results 
are presented in Table10. Overall, for this sub-period, there is more statistical evidence of 
effects of fiscal components on private consumption than for the entire time sample. 
Once more, when a fiscal consolidation takes place, the results are similar to the ones 
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reported in Table 6, with social transfers depicting a negative long-run effect on private 
consumption (β1) and taxes having a positive (non-Keynesian) long-run effect (γ1). 
 
In the presence of fiscal expansions, broadly similar effects on private consumption can 
be observed, as when a fiscal consolidation occurs. Eventually, one could notice that 
when a fiscal expansion takes place the magnitude of the short-run effects of taxes on 
private consumption is somewhat bigger than in the absence of fiscal episodes (γ4 > γ6), 
and also that the long-run effects are not statistically significant in the case of a fiscal 
contraction (γ3). Nevertheless, overall one has to conclude that this evidence does not 
seem to give much support to the hypothesis of asymmetric effects of fiscal episodes. 
 
Still from Table 10, one can see that in the absence of fiscal episodes, general 
government final consumption has mostly no impact on private consumption. On the 
other hand, negative long-run effects can be detected both for social transfers (β5) and for 
taxes (γ5), while the short-run effect in the case of taxes (γ6) is also statistically significant 
and negative. Such effects were essentially absent when the entire time sample was 
considered, which could imply some differences in the public perception of fiscal policy 




In this paper I assessed whether expansionary fiscal consolidation in the European Union 
can be considered part of conventional wisdom. In other words, the paper searches for 
possible evidence of so-called non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy, and this was done 
via panel specifications of private consumption. 
 
Fiscal episodes, expansions and contractions, were determined using the first difference 
of the primary structural budget balance as the relevant indicator, together with three 
alternative strategies. The first one was used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), and the 
second was used by Alesina and Ardagna (1998). The third one, proposed in this paper, 
assumes that a fiscal episode occurs when either the change in the primary cyclically 
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adjusted balance is at least one and a half times the standard deviation of the overall 
sample in one year, or when the change in the primary cyclically adjusted balance is at 
least one standard deviation on average in the last two years. The resulting fiscal episodes 
for the EU-15 countries over the period 1970 to 2005, allow us to identify a set of fiscal 
episodes for the entire country sample, which encompasses fiscal contractions usually 
mentioned in the related literature. 
 
The estimation results for the period 1970s-1990s, using a fixed effects panel data 
strategy show that the long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to general 
government final consumption is negative, which indicates that a reduction of 
government consumption increases private consumption in the long-run. The magnitude 
of such long-run elasticity is higher when a fiscal consolidation episode occurs.  
 
On the other hand, the results seem to indicate that a tax raise, together with a fiscal 
consolidation episode, could have a positive long-run effect on private consumption. 
Furthermore, increases of general government final consumption net of taxes negatively 
impinge on private consumption in the long-run. Put in other words, given an increase in 
government final consumption net of taxes, consumers may behave in a Ricardian way by 
presuming the need for future higher taxes. 
 
The long-run elasticity of social transfers is statistically significant and negative, 
regardless of the existence of fiscal consolidation episodes, but only for the post-
Maastricht period. This negative effect on private consumption could be interpreted as an 
indication of a substitution effect, if the government replaces consumers in paying for, 
say, some health items, or as a non-Keynesian effect with consumers anticipating future 
higher taxes to finance the current social transfers. 
 
Interacting debt threshold variables with the fiscal consolidation episodes dummies, gives 
additional information regarding whether the existence of a higher or a lower level of 
public indebtedness in the previous period makes a difference for private consumption 
decisions. For instance, the short-run effect on private consumption of social transfers is 
positive and statistically significant when there are no fiscal consolidation episodes and 
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when the debt-to-GDP ratio is below the defined threshold (the cross-country year 
average). On the other hand, in the presence of a fiscal consolidation episode and if the 
previous period debt-to-GDP ratio was already above the debt ratio threshold, social 
transfers have a negative (non-Keynesian) long-run effect on private consumption. The 
same is true for the long-run effect of social transfers. Additionally, the possibility of 
asymmetric effects of fiscal episodes does not seem to be corroborated by the results. 
 
Overall, the results obtained for the EU15 for the period 1970–2005 seem to hint to the 
existence of some possible Ricardian behaviour from consumers when a fiscal 
consolidation event takes place. However, one must be cautious to welcome into 
conventional wisdom the idea of expansionary fiscal consolidations. Specific country 
analysis, outside the scope of this paper, could provide additional insight into the 
possibility of such theoretical reasoning. Moreover, it is far from clear whether one can 
use the positive expansionary fiscal consolidations experiences that occurred in the past 
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Table 1 – Some empirical results on non-Keynesian fiscal effects 
Reference Sample Tests performed Method Results 
Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1990) 





Effect of fiscal 
contractions on private 
consumption. 






Effect on consumption 
of public expenditures 
increase. 
OLS Keynesian effects in countries 
where consumers are not 
constrained; null multipliers in 







Effect on consumption 
of budget deficit 
increase. 
OLS, 2SLS There are non-Keynesian 
effects from public spending 
and taxes. 
 
Perroti (1999) OECD countries (1965-
1994) 
Effect on private 
consumption of a 
budget deficit increase. 
VAR The bigger the debt-to-GDP 
ratio the more likely is that the 





19 OECD countries 
(1970-1996) 
Effect on private 
consumption of a 













Effect on national 




Fiscal contractions are 
expansionary when based on 








Effect on the debt-to-




Afonso (2001) EU15 countries (1970-
2001) 
Effect on private 
consumption of a 
budget deficit increase. 
 
OLS pooled Little evidence of non-
Keynesian effects. 



















OLS pooled Inconclusive. 
Ardagna 
(2004)) 
17 OECD countries 
(1975-2002) 
Effect on GDP growth 
of budgetary 
components. 
OLS pooled Evidence of non-Keynesian 
effects. 
 
Giudice et al. 
(2004) 
14 EU countries (1790-
2002) 
Effects on growth. EC QUEST 
model 








9 EU countries (77-04) 
Effect on private 
consumption of 
budgetary components. 
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Table 2 – Fiscal episodes (FE), based on the change in the cyclically adjusted primary 
budget balance 
FE1 FE2 FE3 Country 
 Expansions Contractions Expansions Contractions Expansions Contractions 
AU 
 
76 97 76 84, 97, 01 76 84, 97, 01 
BE 
 
 82-85, 95-96  82-83, 85, 95  82-83 
DK 
 
76, 94 83-87, 95-97 76, 82, 94 83-86, 95-96 76, 94 83-86, 95-96 
FI 
 
79-80, 87 76-77, 95-96, 
00-01 
78-79, 87 76-77, 95-96, 
00-01 




 96-97  95-96  96 
GE 
 
75, 90-92 82-83 75, 90-91 82-83 75, 90-91 83 
GR 
 
81, 85, 89-90, 
01-04 
82-83, 87, 91-97 75, 81, 85, 88-
89, 01-02, 04 
82-83, 86-87, 
91-92, 94-97, 05






75, 78-79, 01-02 76-77, 83-86, 
88-89, 04 
74-75, 78-79, 









 77, 83, 92-94  77, 83, 91-93  77, 83, 92-93 
LU 
 
86-87, 02-05 83-85, 01 86-87, 02-04 83-85, 01 86-87, 02-03 83-85, 01 
NL 
 
 93, 95-98  91, 93, 95-96  95-96 
PT 
 
74, 80-81 82-86, 92 80-81, 05 82-83, 86, 92 80-81, 05 82-83, 86, 92 
SP 
 





84, 87, 95-99 74, 79, 91-93, 
01-02 
76, 83-84, 87, 
95-97 





81, 95-99 72-73, 92-93, 
02-03 


































FE1 – Measure used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996): the cumulative change in the primary cyclically 
adjusted budget balance is at least 5, 4, 3 percentage points of GDP in respectively 4, 3 or 2 years, or 3 
percentage points in one year. 
FE2 – Measure used by Alesina and Ardagna  (1998): the change in the primary cyclically adjusted budget 
balance is at least 2 percentage points of GDP in one year or at least 1.5 percentage points on average in the 
last two years. 
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics (full sample): 1970-2005 
Series Mean Std dev Min Max N 
C 2.423 0.905 1.078 4.794 540 
∆C 0.021 0.023 -0.081 0.122 525 
Y 2.984 0.968 1.418 5.542 540 
∆Y 0.023 0.024 -0.083 0.105 525 
FCE 1.298 1.148 -0.742 4.252 540 
∆FCE 0.034 0.042 -0.080 0.414 525 
TF 1.034 1.128 -1.956 3.808 538 
∆TF 0.036 0.054 -0.516 0.356 522 
TAX 1.617 1.199 -0.534 4.705 530 
∆TAX 0.029 0.043 -0.115 0.171 522 
 
Note: variables are taken as logarithms of real per capita observations. For example, 
C=log(CONS/YDEF)*(1/POP), where CONS – private consumption; YDEF – price deflator of 
GDP, national currency; POP – population. 




Table 4 – Panel unit root results (1970-2005) 
Common unit root (LLC) Individual unit root (IPS) Series 
Statistic Probability N Statistic Probability N 
C -4.64 0.000 505 0.92 0.817 505 
∆C -8.41 0.000 500 -9.91 0.000 500 
Y -2.17 0.015 503 2.56 0.995 503 
∆Y -11.13 0.000 493 -11.78 0.000 493 
FCE -11.01 0.000 518 -5.32 0.000 518 
∆FCE -13.39 0.000 508 -13.39 0.000 508 
TF -9.61 0.000 511 -4.74 0.000 511 
∆TF -11.72 0.000 501 -11.49 0.000 501 
TAX -4.28 0.000 500 0.95 0.830 500 
∆TAX -13.76 0.000 498 -14.00 0.000 498 
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Table 5 – Fixed effects’ estimation results for specification (2), 1970–2005 
 
  FE1 (I) lr FE2 (II) lr FE3 (III) lr 
λ Ct-1 -0.072 *** 
(-4.29) 
 -0.070 *** 
(-4.20) 
 -0.069 *** 
(-4.15) 
 
ω0 Yt-1 0.069 *** 
(4.39) 
0.970 0.068 *** 
(4.38) 
0.966 0.066 *** 
(4.26) 
0.951 
ω1 ∆Yt 0.693 *** 
(14.54) 
 0.690 *** 
(14.31) 
 0.688 *** 
(14.32) 
 






δ1 oecdtY∆  0.043 *** (2.70) 
 0.041 *** 
(2.56) 
 0.040 ** 
(2.50) 
 
α1 FCEt-1 -0.029 *** 
(-2.16) 


























γ1 TAXt-1 0.029 ** 
(2.5) 
0.405 0.032 *** 
(2.63) 



















α2 FCEt-1 -0.015 
(-1.56) 
-0.214 -0.017 * 
(-1.73) 
-0.241 -0.019 * 
(-1.94) 
-0.290 





















γ2 TAXt-1 0.015 * 
(1.86) 
0.209 0.016 * 
(1.94) 






















 0.550 0.577 0.547 
Null hypothesis Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value 
α1−α2 = 0 1.11 0.29 0.61 0.64 0.00 0.95 
γ1−γ2  = 0 2.07 0.15 2.64 0.10 0.61 0.44 
−α1−γ1  = 0 0.00 0.97 0.14 0.71 0.23 0.63 
 
Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level 
respectively. The data sample includes yearly observations for the EU15 countries over the period 1970–
2005. lr – long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to the relevant explanatory variables. FC1 – 
measure used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996); FC2 – measure used by Alesina and Ardagna (1998); FC3 – 
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Table 6 – Fixed effects’ estimation results for specification (2),  
post-Maastricht, 1992–2005 
 
  FE1 (I) lr FE2 (II) lr FE3 (III) lr 
λ Ct-1 -0.216 *** 
(-3.51) 
 -0.226 *** 
(-3.62) 
 -0.222 *** 
(-3.60) 
 
ω0 Yt-1 0.150 *** 
(3.02) 
0.696 0.168 *** 
(4.38) 
0.694 0.155 *** 
(3.17) 
0.698 
ω1 ∆Yt 0.592 *** 
(7.81) 
 0.588 *** 
(7.55) 
 0.594 *** 
(7.71) 
 
δ0 oecdtY 1−  0.051 ** (1.97) 
 0.050 * 
(1.91) 
 0.048 * 
(1.86) 
 






α1 FCEt-1 -0.027 
(-1.01) 












β1 TFt-1 -0.062 *** 
(-3.28) 
-0.287 -0.050 *** 
(-2.69) 
-0.222 -0.053 *** 
(-2.98) 
-0.240 







γ1 TAXt-1 0.091 *** 
(3.24) 
0.422 0.092 *** 
(3.36) 























-0.192 -0.044 * 
(-1.67) 
-0.198 







β2 TFt-1 -0.050 *** 
(-3.33) 
-0.229 -0.048 *** 
(-3.25) 
-0.213 -0.048 *** 
(-3.30) 
-0.218 







γ2 TAXt-1 0.095 *** 
(3.51) 
0.438 0.095 *** 
(3.54) 















 0.094 *** 
(3.04) 
 




 0.617 0.618 0.618 
Null hypothesis Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value 
α1−α2 = 0 0.82 0.37 0.13 0.72 0.59 0.44 
γ1−γ2  = 0 0.10 0.76 0.09 0.77 0.45 0.50 
−α1−γ1  = 0 3.99 0.05 3.02 0.08 3.33 0.07 
β1−β2  = 0 1.13 0.29 0.03 0.87 0.14 0.71 
Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level 
respectively. The data sample includes yearly observations for the EU15 countries over the period 1992–
2005. lr – long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to the relevant explanatory variables. FC1 – 
measure used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996); FC2 – measure used by Alesina and Ardagna (1998); FC3 – 






Working Paper Series No 675
September 2006
 
Table 7 – Fixed effects’ estimation results for specification (6), Byear dummy for debt 
ratio threshold, 1970–2005 
 
  FE1 (I) lr FE2 (II) lr FE3 (III) lr 
λ Ct-1 -0.073 *** 
(-4.22) 
 -0.072 *** 
(-4.14) 
 -0.074 *** 
(-4.20) 
 
ω0 Yt-1 0.065 *** 
(3.96) 
0.894 0.064 *** 
(3.95) 
0.887 0.064 *** 
(3.89) 
0.862 
ω1 ∆Yt 0.678 *** 
(16.06) 
 0.675 *** 
(15.50) 
 0.668 *** 
(15.49) 
 






δ1 oecdtY∆  0.040 ** (2.47) 
 0.038 ** 
(2.30) 
 0.036 ** 
(2.21) 
 










































×  FCm 





























β40 ∆TFt 0.039 ** 
(2.12) 
 0.038 ** 
(2.09) 
 0.039 ** 
(2.15) 
 
γ20 TAXt-1 0.019 * 
(1.86) 
0.262 0.018 * 
(1.75) 




















Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level 
respectively. The data sample includes yearly observations for the EU15 countries over the period 1970–
2005. lr – long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to the relevant explanatory variables. FC1 – 
measure used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996); FC2 – measure used by Alesina and Ardagna (1998); FC3 – 
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Table 7 (cont.) – Fixed effects’ estimation results for specification (6), Byear dummy for 
debt ratio threshold, 1970–2005 
 
  FE1 (I) lr FE2 (II) lr FE3 (III) lr 














β11 TFt-1 -0.027 ** 
(-2.22) 
-0.371 -0.025 ** 
(-1.97) 
-0.349 -0.034 *** 
(-2.91) 
-0.455 
β31 ∆TFt -0.1385 ** 
(-2.13) 





γ11 TAXt-1 0.040 *** 
(3.25) 
0.545 0.041 *** 
(3.43) 










×  FCm 












-0.310 -0.030 ** 
(-2.12) 
-0.405 





















γ21 TAXt-1 0.020 ** 
(2.37) 
0.275 0.019 ** 
(2.23) 























 0.546 0.543 0.540 
Null hypothesis Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value 
β30−β40 = 0 0.23 0.63 0.56 0.45 0.27 0.60 
β40−β31  = 0 7.02 0.01 5.88 0.02 1.23 0.27 
β31−β41  = 0 1.24 0.27 0.93 0.33 0.01 0.93 
γ10−γ11  = 0 2.73 0.09 2.54 0.11 0.24 0.62 
 
Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level 
respectively. The data sample includes yearly observations for the EU15 countries over the period 1970–
2005. lr – long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to the relevant explanatory variables. FC1 – 
measure used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996); FC2 – measure used by Alesina and Ardagna (1998); FC3 – 
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Table 8 – Fixed effects’ estimation results for specification (6), Bcountry dummy for debt 
ratio threshold, 1970–2005 
 
  FE1 (I) lr FE2 (II) lr FE3 (III) lr 
λ Ct-1 -0.076 *** 
(-4.32) 
 -0.074 *** 
(-4.08) 
 -0.075 *** 
(-4.14) 
 
ω0 Yt-1 0.068 *** 
(4.19) 
0.895 0.065 *** 
(3.93) 
0.873 0.067 *** 
(4.06) 
0.886 
ω1 ∆Yt 0.683 *** 
(16.11) 
 0.679 *** 
(15.34) 
 0.675 *** 
(15.55) 
 






δ1 oecdtY∆  0.039 ** (2.45) 
 0.039 ** 
(2.30) 
 0.035 ** 
(2.11) 
 




-1.134 -0.131 ** 
(-2.39) 
-1.745 





















γ10 TAXt-1 0.105 *** 
(5.56) 
1.376 0.051 * 
(1.77) 



















α20 FCEt-1 -0.025 * 
(-1.94) 
-0.334 -0.027 ** 
(-2.00) 
-0.362 -0.027 ** 
(-2.01) 
-0.356 





















γ20 TAXt-1 0.027 *** 
(2.71) 
0.356 0.027 ** 
(2.57) 






















Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level 
respectively. The data sample includes yearly observations for the EU15 countries over the period 1970–
2005. lr – long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to the relevant explanatory variables. FC1 – 
measure used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996); FC2 – measure used by Alesina and Ardagna (1998); FC3 – 
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Table 8 (cont.) – Fixed effects’ estimation results for specification (6), Bcountry dummy 
for debt ratio threshold, 1970–2005 
 
  FE1 (I) lr FE2 (II) lr FE3 (III) lr 














β11 TFt-1 -0.014 
(-1.12) 
 -0.021 * 
(-1.78) 
-0.278 -0.021 * 
(-1.81) 
-0.274 







γ11 TAXt-1 0.038 *** 
(3.33) 












×  FCm 





 0.088 * 
(1.92) 
 






















































 0.553 0.543 0.542 
Null hypothesis Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value 
α10−α20 = 0 25.98 0.00 1.57 0.21 3.82 0.05 
γ11−γ21  = 0 1.01 0.32 1.71 0.19 0.02 0.88 
β11−β21  = 0 2.18 0.14 5.12 0.02 5.49 0.02 
 
Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level 
respectively. The data sample includes yearly observations for the EU15 countries over the period 1970–
2005. lr – long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to the relevant explanatory variables. FC1 – 
measure used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996); FC2 – measure used by Alesina and Ardagna (1998); FC3 – 














Working Paper Series No 675
September 2006
Table 9 – Fixed effects’ estimation results for specification (7), 1970–2005 
  FE1 (I) lr FE2 (II) lr FE3 (III) lr 
λ Ct-1 -0.073 *** 
(-4.35) 
 -0.070 *** 
(-4.20) 
 -0.070 *** 
(-4.23) 
 
ω0 Yt-1 0.070 *** 
(4.42) 
0.961 0.066 *** 
(4.23) 
0.949 0.065 *** 
(4.15) 
0.925 
ω1 ∆Yt 0.689 *** 
(14.37) 
 0.681 *** 
(13.89) 
 0.675 *** 
(14.04) 
 






δ1 oecdtY∆  0.042 *** (2.59) 
 0.040 *** 
(2.50) 
 0.037 ** 
(2.31) 
 




-0.207 -0.017 * 
(-1.74) 
-0.233 





















γ5 TAXt-1 0.014 * 
(1.72) 
0.184 0.015 * 
(1.82) 































 -0.126 * 
(-1.78) 
 














γ2 TAXt-1 0.032 * 
(1.67) 
0.438 0.030 * 
(1.80) 



















α1 FCEt-1 -0.030 ** 
(-2.09) 


























γ1 TAXt-1 0.030 ** 
(2.50) 
0.406 0.033 *** 
(2.66) 






















 0.549 0.547 0.550 
 
Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level 
respectively. The data sample includes yearly observations for the EU15 countries over the period 1970–2005. lr 
– long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to the relevant explanatory variables. FC1, FX1– 
measure used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996); FC2, FX2– measure used by Alesina and Ardagna (1998); FC3, 
FX3– measure based on the method proposed in (1). 
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Table 10 – Fixed effects’ estimation results for specification (7), 1992–2005 
  FE1 (I) lr FE2 (II) lr FE3 (III) lr 
λ Ct-1 -0.218 *** 
(-3.41) 
 -0.233 *** 
(-3.58) 
 -0.238 *** 
(-3.83) 
 
ω0 Yt-1 0.147 *** 
(2.95) 
0.675 0.156 *** 
(3.22) 
0.668 0.161 *** 
(3.35) 
0.674 
ω1 ∆Yt 0.549 *** 
(6.59) 
 0.590 *** 
(7.49) 
 0.562 *** 
(7.11) 
 
δ0 oecdtY 1−  0.058 ** (2.07) 
 0.053 * 
(1.88) 
 0.057 ** 
(2.03) 
 




















β5 TFt-1 -0.056 *** 
(-3.39) 
-0.256 -0.058 *** 
(-3.63) 
-0.265 -0.056 *** 
(-3.65) 
-0.259 







γ5 TAXt-1 0.106 *** 
(3.48) 
0.489 0.104 *** 
(3.45) 















 0.093 ** 
(2.35) 
 0.100 *** 
(2.73) 
 




 -0.084 * 
(-2.03) 
-0.384 




 -0.276 ** 
(-2.55) 
 
β2 TFt-1 -0.061 *** 
(-2.67) 
-0.278 -0.050 ** 
(-2.15) 
-0.230 -0.074 *** 
(-2.92) 
-0.341 




 -0.228 ** 
(-2.17) 
 
γ2 TAXt-1 0.140 *** 
(3.08) 
0.646 0.104 *** 
(3.45) 














 0.183 ** 
(2.23) 
 0.315 *** 
(3.78) 
 














β1 TFt-1 -0.069 *** 
(-3.51) 
-0.316 -0.057 *** 
(-2.95) 
-0.260 -0.060 *** 
(-3.25) 
-0.274 







γ1 TAXt-1 0.104 *** 
(3.25) 
0.477 0.097 *** 
(3.21) 






















 0.611 0.612 0.625 
Null hypothesis Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value 
γ6−γ4 = 0 0.29 0.59 1.03 0.31 6.85 0.01 
γ4−γ3  = 0 0.34 0.56 1.10 0.30 7.55 0.01 
 
Note: see notes to Table 9. 
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